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Highlights
The aviation sector has experienced continued growth over the past 
years, which has significantly enhanced connectivity within Europe, 
and translated into important socio-economic benefits. To put things 
into perspective, European airports alone employ roughly 12.3 million 
people and generate €675 billion each year (4.1% of GDP) in Europe. 
As air transport becomes increasingly prominent for both citizens and 
businesses, traffic flows will continue on a firm upwards trajectory and 
are, in fact expected to double in Europe by 2035 according to IATA 
estimates. This surge in air transport demand is placing increasing 
pressure on scarce airport infrastructure and capacity, which in turn 
can lead to delays, weakened connectivity and lowered quality of ser-
vices.  
Following the creation of a single market for aviation in the 1990s, and 
in light of continuous growth in air transport, the need for regulation 
of airport slots was acknowledged in order to ensure an efficient use 
of capacity at congested airports. Back in 1993 the EU adopted its first 
common rules for the allocation of slots at EU airports in line with 
the IATA’s Worldwide Scheduling Guidelines. Slots, granting the right 
to take-off or land at so-called ‘Level 3’ (or slot-coordinated) airports 
at a specific time period, are allocated by independent coordinators 
on the basis of historic rights (or ‘grandfather rights’) at the given air-
port. What is more, slots ownership is reassessed on an annual basis, 
whereby failure by an airline to use 80% of its allocated slots could 
result in their loss and reallocation to other airlines in the subsequent 
year (i.e. the so-called ‘use it or lose it’ rule). 
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In 2007 and 2008 the Commission adopted communica-
tions on the application of the Slot Regulation. Besides 
seeking to ensure better enforcement of the rules, the 
Commission issued guidelines about the possibility of 
exchanging slots for money, also referred to as ‘secondary 
trading’. The communication furthermore addressed 
critical aspects relating to safeguarding coordinators’ 
independence and facilitating the access to slots to new 
entrants. 
While the existing airport slots regime is based on good 
principles, the aviation landscape has evolved dramati-
cally over the past 25 years, which calls for rules to be 
adapted accordingly to reflect the new market realities. 
In light of this, the 11th Florence Air Forum, which took 
place in Budapest last month, brought together policy 
makers, industry representatives, and academics for a 
timely discussion on the design flaws as well as the needs 
and reform options for a future slot allocation regime. 
More specifically, discussions revolved around the fol-
lowing critical questions: 
1. How effective has the existing slots regime been in 
ensuring optimal connectivity, airport capacity uti-
lisation and allocation of slots to airlines? Are there 
misuses of the rules that could be avoided?
2. What are the various administrative- and market-
based measures (e.g. auctioning, congestion pricing 
models) that could be considered for improving the 
regime’s efficiency?
3. What are the possible ways forward for reforming 
the EU’s airport slots regime? 
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Some Revisions of the Current Slot 
Regulation Regime Might Be in Order
A comment by Matthias Finger and Juan Montero, Florence 
School of Regulation – Transport Area
Airlines have to obtain access to (or slots from) two 
different airports in order to be able to serve a given route. 
Yet, airports are under different national legal regimes, 
are owned by national or local authorities, are managed 
by these same authorities or by private operators and 
are otherwise very different one from another. Building 
a network of coordinated routes requires access to tens 
if not hundreds of very different airports. Slot allocation 
rules emerged at an international level in the early 
1970s in the framework of IATA. Since then, regularly 
updated Worldwide Slot Guidelines are agreed in IATA 
and applied in almost 200 airports worldwide, which 
are declared to be congested. More than half of them are 
located in the European Union. 
The rules regarding the allocation of airport slots in the 
European Union were introduced by way of Regulation 
95/93, the so-called “Slots Regulation”, adopted in 
1993. In other words, the currently still prevailing slot 
allocation regime was enacted more than 25 years ago. 
During the same period global passenger volumes have 
increased from 1,3 billion (1995) to 4,2 billion (2018). 
Minor amendments have been introduced over the 
years, but the last major review of the Slots Regulation, 
proposed in 2011, was finally suspended. It could be time 
to review the European slot allocation regime.
The Existing Rules
At the center of the Slots Regulation are the so-called 
grandfather rights, which state that an airline can 
keep the slot indefinitely during the next same season, 
provided it uses it at least on 80% of occasions during 
that season. If the slot is used less than 80% during a 
season, the slot must be returned to the slot pool for a 
new allocation whereby the “new entrant rule” states that 
50% of slots have to be allocated to newcomers. There are 
no restrictions as to what the slot can be used for (e.g., 
type of aircraft). 
If an airport is declared “congested” (also called “level 3 
airport”), i.e., when demand for slots outstrips supply, 
a so-called “slot coordinator” enters into function. This 
independent body is tasked with allocating the available 
slots in a transparent and efficient way. 
It is important to note that both the IATA Slots 
Worldwide Guidelines and the EU Regulation 95/93 
were created before air transport liberalisation unleashed 
its full dynamics, before the major flag carriers became 
privatised and before airports became really congested. 
At that time, all the big European airports were 
dominated by these national flag carriers. Consequently, 
the existing slots Regulation regime somewhat continues 
this situation into the liberalised and congested world. 
Time for a Change?
Since then, many new entrants, notably low-cost airlines, 
have entered the market with new business models and 
driven down air travel prices, thus leading to a huge 
increase in passengers. Incumbents, in turn, have become 
also more efficient, partly thanks to alliances, mergers, 
joint-ventures, etc. The single European aviation market 
has undeniably delivered good results for passengers.
Astonishingly, the 25-year old slot allocation regime has 
managed to cope with these transformations. The existing 
rules have been able to accommodate new entrants, new 
business models as well as the increase in passenger 
volumes. However, the above outlined slot allocation 
rules have been extended to more and more airports, as 
they became also congested.
How to Reduce Congestion?
The most obvious way to reduce congestion would of 
course be to expand infrastructure capacity. Yet, this may 
be difficult because of lack of funds, limited availability 
of land, noise and environmental regulations and others 
more. But congestion can also be reduced by managing 
demand, as this is often done in other network industries. 
Road tolls can be a case in point. As is the case in many 
infrastructures, demand occurs at peak hours and 
expensive infrastructures are often built just to satisfy 
peak demand. By way of pricing peaks, demand could be 
shifted to hours and days with less demand or even to less 
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congested airports. Here, regulation will typically have to 
be used to incentivise behavioral change.
And this would not be unprecedented in the air transport 
industry. For example, the most sophisticated algorithms 
are used to provide pricing incentives to balance demand 
by airlines themselves. Seats are available even below 
average marginal costs to attract demand when necessary, 
while the highest prices are proposed for the seats for 
which most demand exists. But such instruments – 
though prevalent in other network industries where 
access to infrastructures and pricing are linked – have 
not (yet) been applied when managing airport capacity.
Actually, congestion pricing was never used in airports 
in the past, most likely because airlines are particularly 
wary of price differentiation by airports, as it might cover 
up discriminatory strategies or, even worse, strategies to 
obtain monopoly rents from airlines. Pricing management 
techniques in the hands of actors with market power can 
indeed lead to abuse. Still, in our view, pricing of airport 
capacity (charging for the slot differently according to the 
hour) should be tried out, if it were only experimentally.
Pricing As Way to Promote a More 
Efficient Use of Airport Infrastructures
As a first step towards reducing congestion, some basic 
pricing measures could easily be introduced: indeed, 
airlines do not always use the slots they have originally 
requested. Incentives could for example be considered 
in the form of reservation fees or penalties in case slots 
requested are not effectively used or returned to the pool 
at the last minute.
One could also envision a secondary market for 
trading slots. The current Slots Regulation restricts the 
possibilities of slot trading, but there can be transfer of 
slots, one-by-one, between two carriers. However, despite 
such limitations, a market seems to be emerging, albeit 
today a quite secretive one. This is particularly the case 
when airlines are failing. Cases of using slots as collaterals 
in financial operations have also been reported.
A more flexible approach to secondary markets should 
indeed be envisioned. EU legislation already today 
encourages secondary markets for similar rights, such 
as frequencies in telecommunications markets. We think 
that, for example, access to slots from the secondary 
market by new entrants should be allowed, provided that 
there is transparency in the allocation process and that 
slots do not end up in the hands of incumbents with deep 
pockets. One could be inspired here by the anti-hoarding 
provisions which are applied in the case of spectrum 
allocation.
We think that secondary trading can indeed lead to a 
more efficient use of airport capacity, at least when the 
market is liquid, as high prices will deter the use of certain 
slots by airlines extracting little economic benefit from 
them, such as freight services, services provided with 
small aircrafts or non-profitable routes. Rights over such 
slots should go to airlines with more ambitious strategies.
Exploring the Synergies Between Slot 
Allocation and Airport Charges
But secondary trading will still not increase airport 
capacity supply. Since revenue derived from slot trading 
will not revert to the airport infrastructure manager, it 
cannot be used for capacity expansion. As a matter of 
fact, it cannot even be used as a signal for much needed 
capacity expansion.
Actually, auctioning slots would be a more appropriate 
mechanism to introduce market incentives for a more 
efficient use of airport infrastructure. Slot auctioning has 
indeed been discussed by academics1 and proposed by 
competition authorities2. Still, implementation may be 
difficult and a very sophisticated design for the auction 
appears to be necessary in order to avoid overbidding 
and other exploitative practices.
But one does not need to go as far as auctioning, as 
price differentiations can already be introduced by 
some administrative measures, whereby an airport is 
defining different prices based on the scarcity of slots. As 
a matter of fact, price differentiation, based on objective 
criteria, is already possible under the existing Airport 
Charges Directive 2009/12 and is not always an illegal 
discriminatory practice.
1.  Czerny, A. I. (ed.). (2008). Airport slots: international experiences and 
options for reform. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
2.  Competition and Markets Authority, Advice for the Department for 
Transport on competition impacts of airport slot allocation, December 
2018
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In any case, any substantial evolution of the Slots 
Regulation in the direction of economic incentives will 
need to look at the synergies between the Slots Regulation 
and the Airport Charges Directive. The procedures for 
both slot allocation and for setting airport charges would 
have to be closely coordinated. Similarly, authorities 
regulating airport charges and slot coordinators would 
have to be similarly coordinated, if not integrated into 
one single authority altogether. As a matter of fact, this is 
the most common arrangement across the other network 
industries.
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Main Takeaways From the Discussion 
By Teodora Serafimova, Florence School of  
Regulation – Transport Area
The implementation of the Slot Regulation has improved 
slot allocation at busy European airports in terms of 
neutrality and transparency, contributing to the creation 
of the internal market in aviation.  Having said that, 
however, the regime was conceived at a time when the 
European air transport market was still dominated by a 
small number of traditional national carriers, whereas 
vast transformations have come upon the aviation sector 
since 1993. These have included the airline industry 
liberalisation and the subsequent creation of a Single 
Aviation Market and related EU-level agreements. 
Airlines themselves have witnessed turbulent 
developments, from alliances to mergers, joint ventures 
and bankruptcies. Low cost carriers (LCCs) have emerged 
and are competing (both amongst each other and with 
network carriers) at ‘Level 3’ (or ‘slot-coordinated’) 
airports. These new dynamics call for a rethinking of the 
existing slot allocation rules. 
An analysis carried out already back in 2010-11 on 
the functioning of the Slot Regulation showed that the 
slot allocation system prevented optimal use of scarce 
capacity and thus required improvements, however, the 
subsequent recast process launched by the Commission 
failed to reach consensus about the way forward. As a 
result, 9 years later, the slot allocation regime remains 
unchanged, whereas air traffic is continuously growing 
and European airport capacity is becoming increasingly 
constrained.  
In fact, Europe has witnessed a 34% increase in air 
passenger numbers over the past 5 years. As a result, the 
continent today hosts 104 (out of a total 204 worldwide) 
‘Level 3’ airports. Several of these ‘Level 3’ airports are 
highly saturated with over 85% of the slots occupied in 
the busiest period of the day. The building up of new 
airport infrastructure, however, is becoming increasingly 
impossible and does not provide a sustainable long-term 
solution to addressing capacity issues. 
With this in mind, the European Commission launched 
a new evaluation process in 2019, which will seek to 
build on the 2011 proposal while updating it so as to 
reflect market developments over the past 10 years. The 
evaluation exercise and subsequent recast process aim 
to achieve a set of three high-level objectives, namely to 
secure sufficient capacity to meet demand for air travel; 
to ensure that existing capacity is used efficiently; and 
to guarantee fair and transparent competition between 
market players. The final study is expected to be published 
by Spring 2020. The 11th Florence Air Forum offered a 
well-timed platform for a first exchange of views amongst 
relevant stakeholders. 
How Effective Has the Existing Slots Regime Been in 
Ensuring Optimal Airport Capacity Utilisation and 
Allocation of Slots to Airlines? 
To start with, forum participants agreed that the existing 
slots regime reflects a number of good principles, 
which should be preserved, as they have helped to 
contain flight delays in Europe to a reasonable level. 
For instance, the ‘grandfather rights’ clause has helped 
safeguard predictability and stability for airlines from 
one season to the next. The new entrant rule has been 
an important enabler for airline competition and has 
allowed for new markets to be served. As a consequence 
of the slot allocation regulation, we have observed the 
opening up of numerous new routes, many of which 
have been built up by new carriers, which in turn have 
provided wider consumer choices. To put things into 
perspective, Europe has witnessed over 5,000 new routes 
since 2009, according to IATA estimates. What is more, 
ACI’s connectivity measure shows that seven European 
airports are among the top 20 most connected airports 
globally1. Not the least, the establishment of independent 
slot coordinators has been key for ensuring independent 
capacity allocation.   
Notwithstanding, there was also general agreement 
among the participants that the current regime contains 
design flaws, which have undermined the economic 
efficiency of the slot allocation system, both in terms of 
capacity utilisation and allocation of slots to airlines. It 
was argued that the regime’s grandfathering clause has 
inhibited competition between airlines, by freezing slot 
allocation and by giving an advantage to incumbent 
airlines over LCCs. In other words, the current rules 
were said to act as a barrier to market entry. As a result, 
we have seen the accumulation of large slot holdings by 
a small number of incumbent carriers. Another issue 
raised was the late slot return dates which in turn leave 
1.  Including FRA, AMS, CDG, MUC, LHR, MAD, ZRH
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insufficient time to enable meaningful re-allocation of 
slots to another user, and thus go to waste.
The ‘use it or lose it’ rule was criticised for having led to 
behaviours where airlines hold on to slots even if they 
are unable to use them profitably, as opposed to making 
them available to competitors or new entrants who could 
potentially make better use of them. Due to the absence 
of enforcement measures, it was thus argued that there 
is no guarantee that incumbent slot holders are also the 
most efficient slot users. 
Participants, moreover, raised concerns over observed 
slot misuse (‘double dip’ issue) as a result of poor 
implementation of the regulation’s rules. In other words, 
airlines have been able to cancel up to an additional 20% 
of the slots allocated before the historic rights baseline 
date and retain historic rights to those flights; meaning 
that in reality the 80/20 ‘use it or lose it’ rule is actually 
64/46. The absence of a slot reservation system has, 
furthermore, enabled airlines to request more slots than 
their actual needs, without facing consequences, thus 
blocking out competitors. 
It was pointed out that slot coordinators lack full overview 
of airlines’ network strategies, which oftentimes forces 
them to take subjective decisions regarding transfer of 
significant amounts of capacity. Finally, the current slot 
regulation does not take into account non-scheduled 
and irregular air services, such as business- and general-
aviation. While business- and general-aviation constitute 
a growing market, associated with important benefits 
for the local economy, stakeholders were not convinced 
whether EU regulation is well suited to address it.
What are the Various Administrative- and Market-
Based Measures (E.g. Auctioning, Congestion Pricing 
Models) That Could Be Considered for Improving the 
Regime’s Efficiency? 
As one can see from the above, inefficiencies stemming 
from the current slot allocation rules have constrained 
competition between airlines which in turn can translate 
into negative consequences for consumers in the form 
of lower quality of service and choice.  This calls for a 
rethinking of the current framework and the need to 
bring outdated provisions up to date with new market 
realities. 
As a starting point, the need to agree on a common 
vision and to establish clear definitions was stressed, 
in order to enable a constructive discussion on the 
evaluation and reform options for the current regime. 
Of crucial importance, in particular, is the need to reach 
consensus on what constitutes ‘efficient use’ of slots and, 
subsequently, on a methodology to measure it. While 
no clear consensus emerged during the discussions, a 
number of options for how to define efficiency were 
put forward, namely on the basis of the optimisation of 
passengers transported per slot, on the financial return 
generated for all actors per slot, on its overall impact on 
airport connectivity or even on a combination of all of 
the above.
As regards the definition of ‘slots’, on the other hand, 
participants called for an adjustment in order to convey 
not only a permission but also an obligation to use the 
slot. In other words, it is crucial to stress the fact that slots 
are valuable and their waste comes at a cost. The definition 
would also need to acknowledge the fact that slots are 
not homogeneous, as their value varies significantly with 
time and location.  
In addition to clear definitions, there is a need for 
improved capacity assessment mechanisms in order to 
distinguish better between schedule-facilitated (‘Level 2’) 
and slot-coordinated (‘Level 3’) airports. What is more, 
the introduction of a new category of airports (‘Level 
4’) was recommended in order to reflect the evolving 
needs of a growing number of super-congested airports, 
which may necessitate a different set of probably stricter 
measures.  
Prior to embarking on the discussion around the various 
administrative- and market-based mechanisms for 
the reform of the Slot Regulation, participants agreed 
on the need to identify the root causes of the system’s 
inefficiencies. Moreover, it is important to clarify whether 
the flaws lie in the design of the rules or in the way these 
rules are being applied.
In view of the fact that the grandfather clause was 
identified as a competition inhibitor and a barrier to 
entry, there was broad agreement that it needs to be 
adapted. This could be achieved by factoring ‘additional 
slot criteria’ into allocation decisions, such as aircraft 
operator (i.e., use of ‘priority code’ reflecting individual 
ranking based on slot performance in previous seasons), 
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type of aircraft, type of service (freight vs passenger 
transport), as well as destination. The prioritisation (i.e., 
the weight attributed to each) of these additional criteria 
could be determined at a local level, thereby allowing 
for the emergence of local rules adapted to local needs. 
Their application would, however, need to be overseen 
and reported upon with a view to ensuring a high degree 
of transparency.  
Participants, moreover, called for new rules about data 
sharing in order to secure availability and transparency 
of data related to slot coordination, which in turn are 
a key pre-conditions to a well-functioning market. 
Improvements in the capacity declaration process 
would be needed to address the issue of capacity 
underutilisation. A seasonal declaration of capacity, done 
in a timely and transparent manner, is key in order to 
reflect a continuously changing environment, especially 
at Level-3 airports, as well as in order to enable efficient 
planning. 
When it comes to concrete measures, participants broadly 
agreed that there is scope for evolving the current regime 
by means of adapting administrative rules with a view to 
improve enforcement. One concrete example pertains to 
the enactment of an earlier slot return deadline, so that 
unused slots can be reallocated and reused efficiently. 
The late handing back of unused slots into the slot 
pool or the confirmed misuse of slots, two identified 
causes for inefficiency in the current regime, could be 
corrected by means of immediate sanctions or incentives. 
The introduction of enhanced slot performance 
monitoring standards was another measure suggested to 
ensure that scarce capacity is used efficiently. 
An increased allocation of slots to new entrant airlines, 
notably by means of adapting the New Entrant definition 
in the regulation, was said to be a necessary measure for 
helping new entrants develop a competitive foothold in 
and fairer access to congested airports. The short series 
length, on the other hand, was criticised for leading to 
schedule fragmentation and wasted capacity. To address 
these issues, participants called for an extension of series’ 
length, and for an alignment of durations with airline 
investment cycles. 
Another shortcoming pointed out was the surprising 
lack of provisions in the regulation regarding airline 
insolvency. The only explicit provision to date is to be 
found in the IATA-WSG rules. Some concrete suggestions 
emerged from the discussions. These included the 
automatic revoking of the operating licence when an 
undertaking is put into liquidation, the handing over of 
the slots from the problem airline to the independent 
coordinator, along with the definition of clear deadlines. 
Diverging views were expressed, however, as regards 
the need and effectiveness of market-based measures 
(MBMs). While putting a price tag on slots is indisputably 
key in order to minimise misuse, MBMs, by definition, 
leave little ability to Member States to guarantee the right 
competitive outcomes. In light of this, stakeholders urged 
regulators to approach the design of these measures with 
great caution so as to avoid unintended consequences. 
Slot trading was largely welcomed by the participants as 
a means to encourage slot mobility (‘oil in the wheels’) 
at heavily constrained airports, while minimising slot 
wastage. In the case of airline failure, in particular, slot 
trading could enable new entrants to acquire slots more 
quickly in exchange for cash. This, in principle, can create 
win-win situations, allowing swifter reallocation of slots 
while securing financial resources for failed companies. 
On the downside, it was noted, that in practice the 
purchasing was generally limited to incumbent carriers 
with high revenue or those willing to pay. What is more, 
the reported lack of transparency in relation to secondary 
slot trading was claimed to have resulted in windfall 
profits incurred by airlines at congested airports. 
While auctioning, on the other hand, was referred to 
as the clearest instrument for efficiency, careful design 
will be key in order to minimise unintended distortions 
and side effects. Participants warned that auctions could 
lead to overpricing, making some routes unviable, 
especially where demand is uncertain, and potentially 
even resulting in airline bankruptcies. Moreover, the 
confiscation of airport slots, which the enactment of 
auctioning may entail, risks not only to disadvantage 
smaller carriers, but also to handicap European vis-à-vis 
global carriers, something that potentially could invite 
regulatory retaliation from non-EU countries.  
In view of this, auctioning as well as more generally MBMs 
were presented as more relevant instruments in cases 
where large amounts of new capacity are introduced into 
the market, such as in the case of new runway creation. 
A well-designed auction, moreover, needs to reflect the 
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heterogeneity and the complementarity of slots, as air 
transport is a highly complex and interconnected system. 
Peak load pricing, which was shortly touched upon in 
the discussion, was identified as an effective measure to 
mitigate demand during peak hours. Nevertheless, some 
concerns were expressed over its potential to address 
inefficiencies, given that airport charges are only a small 
part of the overall costs of a flight. What is more, peak 
load pricing works under the assumption that there are 
off-peak periods, whereas this is actually not the case at 
the growing number of super congested airports. Last but 
not least, participants called for enhanced coordination 
between EU rules governing airport slots and airport 
charges in order to avoid contradictory outcomes.  
What Are the Possible Ways Forward for Reforming 
the Airport Slots System?
Slot rules are of crucial importance as they shape the 
aviation market. Consequently, the current revision of 
the regulation needs to strike the right balance between 
efficiency, fair and transparent competition on the one 
hand, and growth and good connectivity on the other. 
What is more, an evolution away from a mere technical 
coordination role of slot coordinators to a more 
regulatory function that oversees capacity, connectivity 
and a broader set of public policy objectives, such as 
climate change, noise pollution and safety may be needed. 
A very important question that needs to be posed during 
the current evaluation is how the future regulation can 
help advance the European Commission’s sustainability 
agenda and related 2050 decarbonisation objectives.  
“Evolution rather than revolution” was a clear take away 
that emerged from the discussions, with participants 
agreeing that we have a good foundation in place (ref. the 
Commission’s 2011 legislative proposal), which we now 
need to build upon and improve while  adapting to the 
new market realities. 
On the topic of administrative measures to improve 
the regime’s efficiency, a number of concrete and easily 
implementable measures were put forward. These 
include the clarification of definitions (e.g., efficient use), 
the introduction of additional criteria in slot allocation 
decisions, being in particular mindful of local needs, the 
increase of the amount of available slots for new entrants, 
as well as the enactment of sanctions (or incentives) for 
the late handing back of unused slots.  
Split opinions were expressed about the applicability 
and effectiveness of market-based measures. Secondary 
slot trading was in principle supported as a beneficial 
practice, encouraging slot mobility at heavily constrained 
airports, in particular by facilitating easier access to slots 
for new entrants while minimising slot wastage. As for 
auctions, stakeholders expressed reservations on the 
grounds that theory sometimes differs from practice, and 
thus called for more careful examination and design in 
order to avoid unintended consequences. In light of this, 
the answer would instead lie in a combination of different 
measures, both administrative and market-based. These, 
in turn, need to formulated in a dynamic way, so as to 
enable flexibility and regular updating of the rules in line 
with market developments.  
The new regulation should moreover be seen as part of 
a bigger system and be consistent with the global WSG 
rules. Stakeholders, furthermore, agreed over the need to 
have closer alignment of rules so as to exploit potential 
synergies between the different pieces of aviation 
regulation, from Air Traffic Management to airport 
charges, and not the least sustainability objectives. 
While the importance of a global systems approach was 
highlighted in conducting the review so as to reflect the 
global nature of the aviation industry, stakeholders also 
stressed the need to adequately address local and regional 
concerns, with consumers being placed at the core of this 
future regulation.
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Evolving the Slot Allocation Regime 
Needs to Be Done Holistically While 
Keeping in Mind the Overall Aviation 
System
A Comment by André Schneider, Geneva Airport 
A very large and diverse group of experts has met to 
discuss on how to navigate to a more efficient airport 
slots allocation regime in Europe. I believe it is important 
on the onset of the work to be done to review the slot 
allocation regime to summarise and clarify some of the 
context that will be necessary to be kept in mind during 
this work. 
First, we have to recognise that any regulation within 
the aviation sector cannot be reviewed in isolation, but 
needs to be seen as part of the complete aviation system. 
This implies that we need to put very much emphasis on 
the linkages between the different regulations within the 
aviation system and consider them when reviewing one 
of them, like the slot allocation. 
Second, the world around the aviation is changing and 
the society is voicing more and more concerns, such as 
the sector’s impact on climate change and noise, as well 
as the way the aviation industry operates and considers 
these concerns. This clearly implies that any work on the 
future regulation has also to consider these concerns, 
and assure that the new slot allocation regime will not 
become a roadblock on the aviation industry’s path to 
address such concerns.
When we look more specifically into how to navigate 
further towards a more efficient airport slots allocation 
regime, we need, on the one hand, to understand the 
different forces that are pulling such regulation, and on 
the other, to have clarity as to what constitutes ‘efficient’ 
in the context of slot allocation. If we look at the different 
pulling forces, we can identify four of them, namely: 
1. Local needs and specificities, such as regional objec-
tives and needs for the network development and 
connectivity, special infrastructural situation, impor-
tance of more ad-hoc aviation, like business and gen-
eral aviation, and as mentioned above, societal and 
local population expectations, like climate change, 
noise, protection against increasing late operations 
hours.
2. Commercial needs, airlines and airport operators 
need to assure that the slot allocation mechanism 
recognises these needs and permits fluid develop-
ment in a commercially attractive environment.
3. The need to recognise that European aviation is part 
of an international system and we need to stay inte-
grated to avoid risks of disrupting our connectivity.
4. Finally, an increasing wish of an upward integration 
between slot allocation and route management. 
Beyond this need to find the right compromise between 
these four influential forces, we also need to agree, when 
we start to work on this regulation, what we understand 
under an efficient approach to slot allocation. Should 
our view on efficiency be based on an optimisation of 
passengers transported per slot, or on financial return 
generated for all actors per slot, or finally on the impact 
on the connectivity of the airport, or a combination of 
the three. It will be crucially important to agree on a 
common view on this to allow a constructive discussion 
around what needs to be done.  
I believe, and the discussions, we had, seem to also 
support this, that this regulation needs improvements 
but no one seems convinced that a total overhaul is 
necessary. Again, the slot allocation regime is part of a 
much wider system, and hence we need to avoid inducing 
change that will affect other systems in an unnecessary 
way or even endanger the overall system. Hence, I believe 
that we need to seek evolution as opposed to revolution, 
and given the systemic character of this regulation, 
we need to approach this evolution in a collaborative 
manner amongst all involved stakeholders as opposed to 
a confrontational manner.
In conclusion, it seems important to facilitate the 
evolution of the slot attribution regime to allow better 
integration of all needs, the local ones as well as the 
commercial ones, whilst staying integrated into the 
worldwide system and allowing a better integration with 
the ATMs. But, this better integration has also to balance 
better weight between these different needs to allow each 
stakeholder to be able to pursue in a coordinated fashion 
their own development path. And as a final thought, 
let us assure that each idea for evolution needs to be 
analysed holistically as a part of the overall system to 
avoid unintended results.
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the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or 
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Introduction
The 11th Florence Air Forum on airport slots brought 
together a diverse range of views on how to improve the 
efficiency of the slot regime in Europe. All agree that a 
form of slot allocation system is required to ensure the 
efficient use of scarce airport capacity. There was also 
agreement that the current administrative regime has 
room for improvement, but further debate and study 
is required to determine the extent of change required 
to reform the slot allocation system to make it viable to 
manage the current levels of congestion at a number of 
European airports. There were disagreements about the 
optimal allocation method, but this is hardly surprising 
given the political economy around the European slot 
allocation system. Reforms will have distributional effects 
and will therefore impact vested interests in different 
ways.
In the remainder of this article, I will follow the structure 
of the Forum and provide a brief synthesis of the three 
key areas of discussion: 1) The effectiveness of the current 
system; 2) possible measures to improve the efficiency 
of the existing regime; and 3) conclusions on proposed 
reforms to the slot allocation system. In the final section, 
I will identify the questions that were left unanswered 
and where further work and attention is required from 
the European Commission (the Commission) and the 
airline industry.
The Effectiveness of the Existing Slot 
Allocation Regime
Excess demand for airport capacity is a growing and 
widespread phenomenon. It is particularly prevalent in 
Europe, which is home to over half of the world’s most 
congested airports. Congestion is forecast to get worse 
over the next few years; it is predicted that by 2040, there 
will 16 airports in Europe that will have congestion levels 
like those faced by London Heathrow today. Expanding 
airport capacity infrastructure is unlikely to be a feasible 
solution to the capacity problems given the political, legal 
and environmental barriers that have been and will likely 
continue to be in place in the short to medium term. 
Given this, the onus is on the slot system to ration demand 
for capacity efficiently. The Commission’s review into the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the airport slot allocation 
regime is therefore important, timely and welcome.
It is logical to first assess the effectiveness of the current 
system. It was argued in some quarters that the current 
system was working adequately and there was little 
evidence to support the need for any reform. Why fix 
something that ‘ain’t broke’? Airline representatives 
presented quantitative evidence to demonstrate the good 
health of the sector: demand has continued to grow; 
despite capacity constraints, there has been a net increase 
in the number of routes being operated out of the most 
congested airports (Level 3 coordinated airports), from 
9,000 in 2009 to over 11,500 routes in 2019; the year-
on-year change in connectivity between 2017 and 2018 
has increased by nearly 10% at Europe’s most connected 
hub airports; utilisation rates at these major hub airports 
was close or very close to 100%; and low cost carriers 
have been able to find homes at congested airports like 
London Gatwick and Dusseldorf. While these facts are 
not disputed, it is not possible to draw any causal link 
between this evidence and effectiveness of the existing slot 
regime. These features could be attributed to a number of 
causal factors, for example, the growth in airline demand 
could have resulted from the general economic growth 
over the period. 
Stronger arguments, which were more qualitative in 
nature, highlighted the operational benefits of having 
an administrative system based on grandfathered rights. 
It creates certainty for users. Airport coordination by 
trusted and independent third parties allows industry 
stakeholders jointly to determine solutions to the complex 
challenges of scheduling and coordination, particularly 
when airlines fly between two fully coordinated airports. 
The administrative process, although not quantitatively 
assessed, will likely incur lower transaction costs than 
alternatives that require a price mechanism. Currently, 
slot coordinators allocate slots, every six months, to 
incumbents if they have used the slot 80% of the time 
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in the previous season. A pricing mechanism such as an 
auction would require airlines to bid periodically for the 
right to have a slot irrespective of how they have used 
the slot in prior periods, imposing costs on airlines to: (i) 
determine the value of the slots they hold and the slots 
they want to hold; and (ii) to participate in the auction 
process, ie bidding for slots. However, over time, you 
would expect airlines’ costs related to auctions would 
fall as they become more familiar with the process. 
Airport coordination is also valuable even when there 
is ample capacity: it assists in reducing delays and the 
costs of congestion by evening out the flow of air traffic 
movements during the day and/or hour; and optimises 
the use of airport facilities and manages congestion in 
other parts of airport infrastructure, such as terminals. 
However, under capacity constraints the current system 
exhibits a number of inefficiencies, including: how 
the scarcity rents enjoyed by airlines are distributed; 
the detrimental effect on competition in downstream 
markets (non-slot holders are prevented from entering 
and/or expanding services at slot-constrained airports); 
and how the absence of price signals make it difficult for 
airlines, airports and regulators to understand the value 
of slots and therefore distort operational and investment 
decision-making. 
The cause of the inefficiencies rests on the design of 
the current system and the regulations from which it 
flows. The current EU regulations are an anachronism. 
Drafted in 1993 with only minor modifications since, the 
regulations have not adapted to the wide-ranging market 
developments that have taken place in the past 25 years. 
The liberalisation of the airline industry, leading to the 
advent of a single aviation market and Open-Skies air 
service agreements, the disruptive innovation of low-
cost carriers, the formation of global alliances, multi-hub 
airlines and of the most relevance, the saturation of 
airport capacity, means that the existing regime is no 
longer fit for purpose. The question, therefore, should not 
be whether the system needs reform but what measures 
are required to address the inefficiencies of the current 
regime. I discuss these measures below.
Improving Efficiency of the Slot Regime 
Through Changes to the Administrative 
System and/or Via the Introduction of 
Market-Based Measures
One of the objectives of the current regulations is for the 
‘efficient use of airport capacity’, but it does not define 
precisely what is meant by efficiency. This has led to a 
variety of interpretations, depending on the perspective 
of the stakeholder. To be able to appraise properly which 
measures should be introduced to improve the efficiency 
of the current system, it is important to determine the 
appropriate framework to answer the question at hand. In 
general terms, the discussions around efficiency appear 
to fall into two categories: first, technical efficiency, which 
focus on a broad range of operational metrics such as 
maximising capacity utilisation, maximising passenger 
per mile, minimising delays etc.; and second, economic 
efficiency, which focusses on allocating slots to users 
that will maximise social welfare. Both are important 
from a policy perspective but to address the problems 
of competition, operational and investment incentives 
and distribution of scarcity rents that eventuate under 
the current system, the latter rather the former is of most 
relevance. 
With this framework in mind, the conventional economic 
argument would be that a pricing solution would lead 
to greater allocative efficiency than an administrative 
system. This is because it is difficult to identify which 
airline values a slot the most without exposing the price 
competing airlines are willing to pay. A pricing solution 
is also likely to have beneficial impacts on competition 
in downstream markets, leading to lower airfares and 
better quality of service. Some have argued that a pricing 
solution such as an auction will result in the opposite, ie 
higher airfares because airlines will have to pay for slots 
they currently get for free. These are misplaced fears and 
can be dispelled if the auction is designed so that airlines 
pay an upfront fee for the slot (i.e. a sunk cost) and there 
is a competitive downstream market. Allocating slots 
to the most efficient user should help achieve the latter 
while the authority responsible for approving the auction 
design should consider payment structures so slots fees 
are a sunk rather variable cost. With a pricing solution, 
the scarcity rents, which are currently being enjoyed by 
airlines, would shift away either to the government or 
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airports or both. This again may have positive impacts 
on investment incentives for airport capacity expansion; 
airlines which benefit from rents today have an incentive 
to foreclose or delay airport expansion to protect existing 
profit margins.
These principles were vigorously challenged at the 
Forum. The most important and relevant challenges, 
in my view, were: first, whether the same allocative 
efficiency could be achieved within the administrative 
system accompanied by a formalised, liquid secondary 
market; second, whether the initial allocation of slots via 
an auction would lead to a greater concentration of slots 
to airlines with market power and the deepest pockets; 
and third, whether the allocation problem is too complex 
to be taken account of in auction design.
I will consider each of these in-turn. In principle, a fully 
effective and liquid secondary market should lead to 
improvements in allocative efficiency. The Commission 
put forward a similar solution in its 2011 proposals. 
However, there is limited evidence to suggest that the 
secondary market is working efficiently. In appraising 
this option, the Commission should take heed of the 
discussions at the Forum where some of the major hub 
airlines indicated a less than favourable attitude towards 
secondary trading. At some airports, unless the hub 
carrier is willing to engage with the proposals, most 
of the slots will not be available for trade. This can be 
seen in the example of how the secondary market is 
functioning at London Heathrow, which is probably the 
most developed one in Europe. At London Heathrow 
there have only been a small number of trades and only 
a very small proportion of those have involved British 
Airways (BA), the hub carrier at London Heathrow. 
The secondary market at London Heathrow is relatively 
ineffective and this appears, at least in part, been caused 
by BA’s reluctance to engage in secondary trades.
The key to an efficient slot allocation in the presence of 
capacity constraints, is to ensure that slots are given to 
the airlines that value them the most (i.e. those that are 
willing to pay the marginal social cost), provided that 
no airline has substantial market power. As some of the 
major airports in Europe have hub operations, it is likely 
that a hub carrier will have some degree of market power. 
However, the market power externality has been wrongly 
conflated with a ‘deep pocket’ argument suggesting that 
airlines that have a stronger balance sheet would bid 
more aggressively and more than their willingness to 
pay to obtain slots. Any such conduct belies economic 
rationality. An efficient auction would lead to allocation 
of slots to the user with the highest willingness to pay 
and would require participants to act in their own best 
commercial interests, i.e. bid truthfully reflecting the 
value they hold for the slot. Auction design should be 
able to address the market power externality, for example 
by introducing limits on slot holdings or ring-fencing 
slots to facilitate entry and expansion by other airlines; 
and create the right incentives for participants to bid 
according to the value they hold.  
It is also not disputed that the auction process would be a 
significant shift from the status quo and clearly there is a 
risk this could increase complexity to the sector. These are 
legitimate and serious concerns that must be considered 
in any policy formulation. It is an area that requires 
further study and research, and the Commission should 
investigate these matters thoroughly before presenting its 
new proposals.
Conclusions on the Proposed Reforms to 
the Airport Slot Allocation System
“Evolution, not revolution” was appropriated as a strap 
line for the Forum and to characterise the nature of the 
changes required to make the current system relevant 
for today’s market. It is not a view I share nor is it one 
that effectively captures the breadth and depth of the 
discussions. 
The prevailing view was that the current system is not fit 
for purpose. The ‘do nothing’ option cannot be feasibly 
accepted, and this was broadly a consensus view at the 
Forum. 
From an economic and regulatory perspective, an 
administrative mechanism by its very nature will not lead 
to efficient or effective outcomes. Some of the proposals 
for evolutionary change such as a revised new entrant 
rule will lead at best to marginal improvements. A revised 
administrative system will still face some of the same 
difficulties as today, such as airlines’ incentives to game 
the system by exploiting the information asymmetry that 
exists between them and the coordinators. 
Having heard all of the arguments at the Forum, I still 
believe that auctions will lead to the most efficient use 
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of slots and help address the manifest problems of the 
administrative system. Secondary trading might also lead 
to improvements but as discussed earlier, it is dependent 
on airlines willingness to trade and given what was said 
at the Forum, I am not convinced that there is much 
appetite for this happen, at least from some of the big hub 
carriers.   
The Commission, in revisiting its proposals for change, 
must take full account of the changes that have taken place 
in the market, not only since 1993 when the regulations 
were introduced but even in the last 8 years, since their 
last assessment of the issue.
Another important lesson from the Forum was to 
ensure that the slot allocation system is considered 
in context. While the effectiveness of slot allocation 
has major implications for the effective functioning 
of the air services market, it is but one cog in a highly 
complex system. The Commission in its review of the slot 
regulations must assess the impact on the wider aviation 
system, and the interrelations, economic, political and 
legal, of these different aspects. Silo thinking on one part 
of a network infrastructure is unlikely to lead to good 
outcomes in the long run.
I end with a list of questions that were left unanswered 
and ones that require further study and attention to 
arrive at an efficient solution to address the limitations of 
slot allocation. The key work to be undertaken includes:
• Can secondary trading be effective? A quantitative 
study on the effectiveness of secondary trading;
• What can be done to encourage secondary trading 
within an administrative allocation system? Policy 
ideas on what can be done to facilitate and encourage 
slot trading within the current administrative 
framework, including creating incentives for airlines 
to trade, e.g. slot reservation charges; and
• What is the optimal auction design? Comprehensive 
study by auction experts on auction design to allocate 
slots, including mitigations on externalities such as 
market power. 
My view is that it is important that, the Commission, 
academics in the field and the airline industry should 
conduct these studies before finalising any policy 
positions.
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